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Introduction  
Chairman  Burgess,  Ranking  Member  Schakowsky,  and  Members  of  the  
Subcommittee:    Thank  you  for  inviting  me  to  testify.    My  name  is  Paul  Gugliuzza.    I  am  
an  associate  professor  of  law  at  Boston  University  School  of  Law.    I  testify  in  my  
individual  capacity,  not  representing  my  institution.      
My  research  focuses  on  patent  law  and  patent  litigation.    Most  relevant  to  this  
hearing,  I  have  spent  the  past  two  years  studying  the  issue  of  patent  demand  letters,  
focusing  in  particular  on  efforts  by  both  state  governments  and  the  federal  government  
to  address  the  problem  of  unfair  and  deceptive  conduct  in  patent  enforcement.1      
To  briefly  summarize  my  conclusions:    A  small  number  of  patent  holders,  often  
called  “bottom  feeder”  patent  trolls,  have  been  abusing  the  patent  system.    These  patent  
holders  blanket  the  country  with  thousands  of  letters  demanding  that  the  recipients  
purchase  a  license  for  a  few  thousand  dollars  or  else  face  an  infringement  suit.    The  
letters  are  usually  sent  to  small  businesses  and  nonprofits  that  do  not  have  the  resources  
to  defend  against  claims  of  patent  infringement.    And  the  letters  often  contain  false  or  
misleading  statements  designed  to  scare  the  recipient  into  purchasing  a  license  without  
investigating  the  merits  of  the  allegations.    In  response  to  this  troubling  behavior,  
legislatures  in  eighteen  states  have  recently  adopted  statutes  that,  generally  speaking,  
outlaw  bad  faith  assertions  of  patent  infringement.      
                                                
1  For  an  in-­‐‑depth  discussion  of  this  research,  see  Paul  R.  Gugliuzza,  Patent  Trolls  and  Preemption,  
101  VA.  L.  REV.  (forthcoming  2015),  available  at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539280.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2571437 
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These  statutes,  however,  may  be  unconstitutional.    The  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  
the  Federal  Circuit,  which  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  appeals  in  patent  cases  in  the  
federal  courts,  has  held  that  patent  holders  are  immune  from  civil  claims  challenging  
acts  of  patent  enforcement  unless  the  patent  holder  knew  that  its  infringement  
allegations  were  objectively  baseless.    This  rule  could  provide  patent  holders  with  
nearly  absolute  immunity  from  liability  under  the  new  statutes.    In  fact,  as  I  discuss  in  
more  detail  below,  the  rule  has  already  immunized  two  notorious  trolls,  Innovatio  IP  
Ventures  and  MPHJ  Technology  Investments,  from  legal  challenges  to  their  
enforcement  campaigns  under  state  consumer  protection  and  deceptive  trade  practices  
laws.  
Although  the  Federal  Circuit  has  sometimes  called  this  immunity  rule  a  matter  of  
the  federal  Patent  Act’s  “preemption”  of  state  law,  the  rule  could  also  limit  the  ability  of  
the  federal  government  to  regulate  patent  enforcement  behavior.    This  is  because  the  
Federal  Circuit’s  decisions  are  not  grounded  in  the  Constitution’s  Supremacy  Clause,  
which  is  the  usual  source  of  preemption  doctrine,  but  in  the  First  Amendment  right  to  
petition  the  government.    Unlike  the  Supremacy  Clause,  the  First  Amendment  limits  the  
power  of  the  federal  government,  not  just  state  governments.    Accordingly,  patent  
holders  may  also  be  able  to  invoke  this  immunity  to  thwart  federal  initiatives  to  fight  
patent  trolls—including  any  legislation  this  Committee  might  consider.    
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To  be  clear,  no  court  has  yet  addressed  the  constitutionality  of  the  new  state  
statutes.    Moreover,  as  I  discuss  in  more  detail  below,  there  is  a  strong  argument  that  
the  Federal  Circuit’s  immunity  doctrine  is  wrong  as  a  matter  of  law,  policy,  and  
historical  practice.    So,  it  is  entirely  possible  that  the  Federal  Circuit  could  revise  its  
immunity  doctrine  to  accommodate  greater  regulation  of  patent  enforcement  conduct.    
Also,  to  the  extent  that  cases  challenging  patent  enforcement  conduct  proceed  in  state  
court,  those  state  courts  are  not  required  to  follow  the  Federal  Circuit’s  expansive  
immunity  doctrine.      
This  hearing  provides  a  welcome  occasion  to  discuss  the  innovative  steps  that  
state  governments  have  taken  to  combat  unfair  and  deceptive  patent  enforcement.    Any  
bill  advanced  by  this  Committee  should,  in  my  view,  capitalize  on  the  respective  
strengths  of  state  governments  and  the  federal  government  in  this  area.    The  strengths  
of  state  governments  include:    (1)  the  quantity  of  law  enforcement  resources  that  could  
be  provided  by  dozens  of  states’  attorneys  general  offices  cooperating  to  fight  abusive  
patent  enforcement,  (2)  the  accessibility  of  state  governments  to  the  small  businesses,  
nonprofits,  and  local  governments  likely  to  be  targeted  by  deceptive  campaigns  of  
patent  enforcement,  and  (3)  the  ability  of  targeted  organizations  to  act  as  private  
attorneys  general  under  both  the  new  state  statutes  and  other  state  consumer  protection  
and  deceptive  trade  practices  laws.    By  contrast,  federal  legislation  on  patent  demand  
letters  would  provide  the  obvious  benefits  of  legal  uniformity  and  greater  predictability  
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for  patent  holders  about  whether  or  not  their  enforcement  actions  are  legal.    In  addition,  
as  I  explain  in  more  detail  below,  federal  legislation  could  clarify  difficult  jurisdictional  
issues  that  currently  arise  in  cases  challenging  the  lawfulness  of  patent  enforcement  
conduct.  
If  this  Committee  determines  that  federal  legislation  is  warranted,  that  legislation  
should,  in  my  view,  specifically  condemn  “bad  faith”  assertions  of  patent  infringement.    
Until  the  Federal  Circuit  adopted  its  “objective  baselessness”  requirement,  courts  had  
applied  a  bad  faith  standard  for  nearly  a  century,  striking  an  appropriate  balance  
between  the  goals  of  punishing  extortionate  schemes  of  patent  enforcement  and  
respecting  patent  holders’  rights  to  make  legitimate  allegations  of  infringement.      
I.   The  Problem:    Bottom  Feeder  Patent  Trolls  
In  the  past  decade,  scholars  and  policymakers  have  fixated  on  “patent  trolls”  or,  
less  pejoratively,  nonpracticing  entities  (NPEs).    NPEs  are  often  criticized  because  they  
do  not  manufacture  products  or  provide  services.    Instead,  they  exist  primarily  to  
enforce  patents.    But  the  NPE  business  model  is  not  inherently  nefarious.    Research  
universities,  for  example,  usually  cannot  commercialize  the  patents  obtained  by  their  
faculty,  so  they  license  the  technology  to  others  and  sometimes  sue  for  infringement.    
NPEs  can  also  help  monetize  inventions  by  those  who  cannot  afford  to  assert  their  
patents  in  litigation,  such  as  individual  inventors  and  start-­‐‑up  companies.        
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In  the  past  few  years,  however,  a  species  of  “bottom  feeder”  trolls  has  emerged.    
These  trolls  send  out  hundreds  or  thousands  of  demand  letters  at  one  time,  relying  on  
the  high  cost  of  patent  litigation  in  the  hope  of  eliciting  a  nuisance-­‐‑value  settlement,  that  
is,  a  settlement  payment  that  is  less  that  the  amount  it  would  cost  to  investigate  the  
infringement  allegations.2    Bottom  feeders  target  small  businesses,  nonprofits,  and  even  
local  governments,  knowing  that  those  organizations  are  unfamiliar  with  patent  
litigation  and  likely  cannot  afford  to  defend  against  infringement  claims.3      
One  well-­‐‑known  bottom-­‐‑feeder  troll  is  the  company  MPHJ  Technology  
Investments.    In  2012  and  2013,  MPHJ  sent  letters  to  over  16,000  small  businesses  
throughout  the  United  States.4    The  letters  accused  the  recipients  of  infringing  a  patent  
that  covers  the  use  of  an  office  scanner  to  send  documents  via  email.    MPHJ  demanded  
that  each  recipient  purchase  a  license  for  about  $1200  per  employee  or  else  face  an  
infringement  suit  in  federal  court.      
Another  bottom  feeder  who  has  engaged  in  a  mass  enforcement  campaign  is  
Innovatio  IP  Ventures.    Beginning  in  2011,  Innovatio  sent  letters  to  over  8,000  businesses  
throughout  the  United  States,  including  bakeries,  hotels,  and  restaurants,  claiming  that  
                                                
2  See  Mark  A.  Lemley  &  A.  Douglas  Melamed,  Missing  the  Forest  for  the  Trolls,  113  COLUM.  L.  REV.  
2117,  2126  (2013).  
3  See  Colleen  Chien  &  Edward  Reines,  Why  Technology  Customers  Are  Being  Sued  En  Masse  for  
Patent  Infringement  and  What  Can  Be  Done,  49  WAKE  FOREST  L.  REV.  235,  235  (2014).      
4  Samples  of  these  letters  can  be  found  in  a  complaint  for  unfair  competition  filed  by  the  Federal  
Trade  Commission,  In  re  MPHJ  Tech.  Investments,  LLC,  No.  142-­‐‑3003  (Nov.  6,  2014),  available  at  
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-­‐‑proceedings/142-­‐‑3003/mphj-­‐‑technology-­‐‑investments-­‐‑llc-­‐‑matter,  
archived  at  http://perma.cc/T93Z-­‐‑SVJL.  
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those  businesses  infringed  its  patents  by  providing  customers  with  wireless  Internet  
access.5    Innovatio  demanded  that  the  recipients  purchase  licenses  for  about  $2500  each  
or  risk  being  sued  for  patent  infringement.      
The  demand  letters  sent  in  these  mass  enforcement  campaigns  are  often  rife  with  
false  or  deceptive  statements.    MPHJ,  for  instance,  obscured  its  identity  by  sending  
letters  through  eighty-­‐‑one  shell  companies  with  nonsensical  names  such  as  DolVol,  
GanPan,  and  JitNom.    To  intimidate  recipients  into  quickly  purchasing  a  license,  MPHJ  
threatened  to  sue  if  the  recipient  did  not  respond  within  two  weeks.    But,  in  fact,  MPHJ  
never  sued  any  of  the  targets  of  its  mass  enforcement  campaign.    Likewise,  both  
Innovatio  and  MPHJ  falsely  claimed  that  many  other  businesses  had  already  purchased  
licenses  to  their  patents.    
II.   State  Governments  Respond  
State  legislatures  across  the  country  have  responded  to  these  troublesome  patent  
enforcement  tactics.    In  the  past  two  years,  legislatures  in  eighteen  states  have  adopted  
statutes  outlawing  false  or  bad  faith  assertions  of  patent  infringement,  and  nearly  a  
dozen  additional  states  are  currently  considering  similar  legislation.6    The  most  popular  
model  for  state  legislation  is  a  statute  first  adopted  in  Vermont,  which,  in  May  2013  
                                                
5  See  In  re  Innovatio  IP  Ventures,  LLC  Patent  Litig.,  921  F.  Supp.  2d  903,  907  (N.D.  Ill.  2013).      
6  For  a  regularly  updated  list  of  state  legislative  actions,  see  Patent  Progress’s  Guide  to  State  Patent  
Legislation,  PATENT  PROGRESS,  http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-­‐‑progresss-­‐‑guide-­‐‑state-­‐‑patent-­‐‑
legislation  (last  visited  Feb.  22,  2015),  archived  at  http://perma.cc/4VXD-­‐‑DF6E.      
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became  the  first  state  to  adopt  legislation  specifically  regulating  patent  enforcement.7    
Since  then,  thirteen  other  states  have  adopted  statutes  modeled  after  Vermont’s,  with  
some  minor  variations.8    And  the  Council  of  State  Governments  included  the  Vermont  
statute  in  its  most  recent  volume  of  suggested  state  legislation.9      
The  core  provision  of  the  Vermont  statute  states,  simply:    “A  person  shall  not  
make  a  bad  faith  assertion  of  patent  infringement.”10    The  statute  then  lists  several  
factors  that  courts  “may  consider  .  .  .  as  evidence  that  a  person  has  made  a  bad  faith  
assertion  of  patent  infringement,”  including:  
•   The  demand  letter  does  not  contain:    the  patent  number,  the  name  
and  address  of  the  patent  holder,  or  “factual  allegations  concerning  
the  specific  areas  in  which  the  target’s  products,  services,  and  
technology  infringe  the  patent.”    
•   The  demand  letter  lacks  the  information  noted  above,  the  target  
requests  the  information,  and  the  patent  holder  fails  to  provide  the  
information  “within  a  reasonable  amount  of  time.”    
•   The  patent  holder  has  previously  filed  or  threatened  to  file  lawsuits  
and  those  threats  lacked  the  information  noted  above  or  were  found  
by  a  court  to  be  meritless.    
•   Prior  to  sending  the  demand  letter,  the  patent  holder  did  not  conduct  
an  analysis  comparing  the  claims  of  the  patent  to  the  target’s  
                                                
7  Interestingly,  the  United  Kingdom  has  recognized  a  civil  claim  for  persons  targeted  with  
groundless  threats  of  suit  for  patent  infringement  since  1883.    For  a  discussion  of  this  so-­‐‑called  “threats  
action,”  see  U.K.  LAW  COMM’N,  PATENTS,  TRADE  MARK  AND  DESIGN  RIGHTS:    GROUNDLESS  THREATS  (Apr.  
2014).          
8  The  states  that  have  followed  Vermont’s  model  include  Alabama,  Georgia,  Idaho,  Louisiana,  
Maine,  Maryland,  Missouri,  New  Hampshire,  North  Carolina,  Oregon,  South  Dakota,  Utah,  and  Virginia.      
9  See  Suggested  State  Legislation,  COUNCIL  OF  STATE  GOVERNMENTS,  http://www.csg.org/  
programs/policyprograms/SSL.aspx  (last  visited  Feb.  22,  2015),  archived  at  http://perma.cc/3U5Y-­‐‑P876.  
10  VT.  STAT.  ANN.,  tit.  9,  §  4197(a).  
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products,  services,  or  technology,  “or  such  an  analysis  was  done  but  
does  not  identify  specific  areas  in  which  the  products,  services,  and  
technology  are  covered  by  the  claims  in  the  patent.”    
•   The  demand  letter  demands  payment  of  a  license  or  a  response  
“within  an  unreasonably  short  period  of  time.”    
•   The  patent  holder  “offers  to  license  the  patent  for  an  amount  that  is  
not  based  on  a  reasonable  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  license.”    
•   “The  claim  or  assertion  of  patent  infringement  is  meritless,  and  the  
person  knew,  or  should  have  known,  that  the  claim  or  assertion  is  
meritless.”    
•   “The  claim  or  assertion  of  patent  infringement  is  deceptive.”11    
In  addition  to  the  Vermont  model,  two  other  types  of  state  patent-­‐‑demand-­‐‑letter  
statutes  exist.    First,  Wisconsin  has  adopted  a  statute  that  outlines  in  detail  the  
information  that  a  demand  letter  must  include,  such  as  the  name  of  the  patent  owner,  
an  identification  of  each  patent  claim  being  asserted,  an  identification  of  the  allegedly  
infringing  product  or  service,  and  “[f]actual  allegations  and  an  analysis  setting  forth  in  
detail”  the  patent  holder’s  theory  of  infringement.12    The  Wisconsin  statute  can  be  
violated  in  two  ways:    First,  if  the  letter  lacks  any  of  the  required  information,  the  target  
may  notify  the  sender  that  the  letter  is  incomplete.    If  the  sender  does  not  provide  the  
missing  information  within  thirty  days,  the  sender  violates  the  statute.13    Second,  a  
                                                
11  Id.  §  4197(b).    The  statute  also  lists  several  factors  suggesting  that  an  infringement  assertion  was  
not  made  in  bad  faith,  many  of  which  are  simply  the  opposite  of  the  factors  listed  in  the  text.    See  id.  
§  4197(c).  
12  WIS.  STAT.  §  100.197(2)(a).  
13  Id.  §  100.197(2)(c).  
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demand  letter  violates  the  Wisconsin  statute  if  it  “contain[s]  false,  misleading,  or  
deceptive  information.”14      
A  third  and  final  model  of  state  legislation  has  been  adopted  in  Illinois,  
Oklahoma,  and  Tennessee.    Rather  than  prohibiting  false  or  bad  faith  assertions  of  
patent  infringement,  these  statutes  outline  specific  acts  or  omissions  that  violate  the  
statute,  such  as  “falsely  stat[ing]  that  litigation  has  been  filed”  against  the  recipient,  
seeking  compensation  for  infringement  of  a  patent  that  has  been  held  invalid  or  has  
expired,  or  failing  to  include  “factual  allegations  concerning  the  specific  areas  in  which  
the  [recipient’s]  products  .  .  .  infringe[]  the  patent.”15    The  statutes  also  make  clear  that  it  
is  not  unlawful  to  notify  others  of  or  to  seek  compensation  for  patent  infringement,  so  
long  as  the  patent  owner  “is  not  acting  in  bad  faith.”16  
All  of  the  state  statutes  provide  for  enforcement  by  state  officials,  such  as  the  
state  attorney  general.    And  most  of  the  statutes  create  a  private  right  of  action  for  the  
targets  of  unlawful  infringement  assertions.    The  remedies  available  in  those  private  
suits  include  equitable  relief,  compensatory  damages,  treble  damages,  and  attorneys’  
fees.      
In  addition  to  these  new  state  statutes,  attorneys  general  in  several  states  have  
begun  to  use  their  powers  under  consumer  protection  and  deceptive  trade  practices  
                                                
14  Id.  §  100.197(2)(b).  
15  E.g.,  OKLA.  STAT.  tit.  23,  §  112(A).  
16  E.g.,  id.  §  112(B).  
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laws  to  fight  bottom-­‐‑feeder  trolls.    Vermont’s  attorney  general,  for  instance,  sued  MPHJ  
in  May  2013,  alleging  that  MPHJ’s  demand  letters  violated  Vermont’s  general  consumer  
protection  statute.17    (The  suit  was  filed  two  weeks  before  Vermont’s  demand  letter  
statute  took  effect.)    Around  the  same  time,  the  attorney  general  of  Nebraska  began  an  
investigation  into  whether  a  law  firm  representing  MPHJ  and  Activision  TV,  another  
NPE,  had  violated  Nebraska’s  consumer  protection  and  deceptive  trade  practices  
statutes.18    And  the  attorneys  general  of  New  York  and  Minnesota  have  negotiated  
agreements  with  MPHJ  to  curb  its  enforcement  activity.19      
III.   Constitutional  Limits  on  State  Governments  and  the  Federal  Government  
These  new  state  statutes  and  state  law  enforcement  actions  challenge  the  
conventional  wisdom  that  patent  law  is  the  domain  of  the  federal  government  alone.  
Indeed,  the  website  of  the  U.S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  now  counsels  persons  who  
receive  demand  letters  that  are  “deceptive,  predatory,  or  in  bad  faith,”  to,  among  other  
things,  “fil[e]  a  complaint  with  your  state  attorney  general’s  office.”20    Doctrines  of  
                                                
17  See  Consumer  Protection  Complaint  at  1-­‐‑8,  Vermont  v.  MPHJ  Tech.  Investments,  LLC,  No.  282-­‐‑
5-­‐‑13wncv  (Vt.  Super.  Ct.  May  8,  2013),  available  at  http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/  
Vermont%20v%20MPHJ%20Technologies%20Complaint.pdf,  archived  at  http://perma.cc/93X8-­‐‑G6NS.  
18  See  Letter  from  Jon  Bruning,  Attorney  Gen.  of  Neb.,  to  M.  Brett  Johnson,  Partner,  Farney  
Daniels  LLP  (July  18,  2013),  available  at  http://ipwatchdogs.com/cases/NE-­‐‑cease-­‐‑desist.pdf,  archived  at  
http://perma.cc/FQ9Y-­‐‑WSGV.  
19  See  Investigation  by  Eric  T.  Schneiderman,  Att’y  Gen.  of  the  State  of  New  York,  of  MPHJ  Tech.  
Investments,  LLC,  Assurance  No.  14-­‐‑015,  at  12-­‐‑19  (Jan.  13,  2014);  Julie  Samuels,  Minnesota:    Patent  Trolls  
are  Not  Welcome  Here  (Aug.  21,  2013),  ELEC.  FRONTIER  FOUND.,  https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/  
minnesota-­‐‑patent-­‐‑trolls-­‐‑are-­‐‑not-­‐‑welcome-­‐‑here,  archived  at  http://perma.cc/D2P7-­‐‑4VGD.  
20  I  Got  a  Letter  .  .  .  ,  U.S.  PATENT  &  TRADEMARK  OFF.,  http://www.uspto.gov/patents/litigation/  
I_got_a_letter.jsp  (last  visited  Feb.  22,  2015),  archived  at  http://perma.cc/Y3RL-­‐‑S3D3.  
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federal  constitutional  law  developed  by  the  Federal  Circuit,  however,  may  invalidate  
the  new  state  statutes  and  limit  the  enforcement  authority  of  state  officials.    Moreover—
and  most  importantly  for  the  purpose  of  this  hearing—those  same  doctrines  may  also  
limit  the  legislative  power  of  Congress  and  the  enforcement  authority  of  the  federal  
government.      
A.   Judicially  Created  Immunity  for  Patent  Holders  
For  decades,  persons  accused  of  patent  infringement  have  tried  to  assert  civil  
claims  against  overzealous  patent  holders.    Those  claims  are  sometimes  grounded  in  
state  law  (for  example,  claims  for  unfair  competition  or  for  tortious  interference  with  
business  relations)  and  other  times  grounded  in  federal  law  (for  example,  claims  for  
unfair  competition  under  the  Lanham  Act  or  for  violations  of  the  civil  RICO  statute).    
The  Federal  Circuit,  however,  has  held  that  patent  holders  are  mostly  immune  from  
civil  liability  for  their  enforcement  behavior.    According  to  the  Federal  Circuit,  to  strip  a  
patent  holder  of  this  immunity,  the  plaintiff  must  prove  not  only  the  elements  of  its  
state  or  federal  claim,  it  must  also  prove,  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence,  (1)  that  the  
patent  holder’s  infringement  allegations  were  “objectively  baseless,”  meaning  that  no  
reasonable  litigant  could  have  expected  to  succeed,  and  (2)  that  the  patent  holder  made  
its  infringement  allegations  with  knowledge  of  their  inaccuracy  or  with  reckless  
disregard  for  their  accuracy.21          
                                                
21  Globetrotter  Software,  Inc.  v.  Elan  Computer  Grp.,  Inc.,  362  F.3d  1367,  1377  (Fed.  Cir.  2004).  
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Although  no  court  has  yet  applied  this  standard  to  the  new  state  statutes,  it  
seems  to  ensure  that  most  tactics  employed  by  bottom-­‐‑feeder  trolls  will  remain  legal.    
To  begin  with,  the  rule  requires  a  plaintiff  to  show  that  the  patent  holder’s  infringement  
allegations  were  objectively  baseless.22    Accordingly,  false  statements  about  matters  
peripheral  to  the  infringement  claims,  such  as  misrepresentations  about  how  many  
other  persons  have  purchased  licenses  to  the  patents,  will  not  strip  a  patent  holder  of  
immunity.23      
Moreover,  it  is  very  difficult  to  prove  that  infringement  allegations  were  
objectively  baseless.    The  issue  of  infringement  often  turns  on  the  judge’s  interpretation  
of  the  patent’s  claims.    Those  decisions  are  notoriously  unpredictable,24  making  it  hard  
to  say  that  any  given  infringement  allegation  was  so  unlikely  to  succeed  that  it  was  
objectively  baseless.    Also,  an  accused  infringer  who  seeks  to  show  that  a  patent  is  
invalid  must  prove  invalidity  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence.25    Thus,  even  if  a  patent  
probably  does  not  satisfy  validity  requirements  such  as  novelty  and  nonobviousness,  
this  high  burden  of  proof  could  still  give  the  patent  holder  a  reasonable  hope  of  success.    
                                                
22  See  id.  (“A  plaintiff  claiming  that  a  patent  holder  has  engaged  in  wrongful  conduct  by  asserting  
claims  of  patent  infringement  must  establish  that  the  claims  of  infringement  were  objectively  baseless.”  
(emphasis  added)).  
23  See,  e.g.,  In  re  Innovatio  IP  Ventures,  LLC  Patent  Litig.,  921  F.  Supp.  2d  903,  922  (N.D.  Ill.  2013)  
(dismissing  claims  challenging  patent  enforcement  conduct  where  the  alleged  false  statements  “[were]  all  
peripheral  to  the  question  of  infringement”);  Activision  TV,  Inc.  v.  Bruning,  No.  8:13-­‐‑CV-­‐‑215,  slip  op.  at  
13  (D.  Neb.  Sept.  2,  2014)  (applying  Federal  Circuit  law,  noting  that  “the  crucial  issues  to  establish  
objective[]  baselessness  involve  validity  and  infringement”).  
24  See  Dan  L.  Burk  &  Mark  A.  Lemley,  Fence  Posts  or  Sign  Posts?    Rethinking  Patent  Claim  
Construction,  157  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1743,  1744-­‐‑46  (2009).  
25  See  Microsoft  Corp.  v.  i4i  Ltd.  P’ship,  131  S.  Ct.  2238,  2242  (2011).  
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That  is  sufficient  under  Federal  Circuit  law  to  immunize  the  patent  holder  from  
liability.    In  my  research,  I  have  conducted  an  extensive  survey  of  Federal  Circuit  cases  
applying  this  immunity  rule,  and  I  have  found  that  it  is  extremely  rare  for  a  plaintiff  to  
prevail  on  a  claim  challenging  patent  enforcement  conduct.26      
Most  disturbingly,  two  federal  district  courts  have  relied  on  the  Federal  Circuit’s  
immunity  doctrine  to  shelter  Innovatio  and  MPHJ.    After  Innovatio  began  its  
enforcement  campaign  against  users  of  wireless  Internet  routers,  the  manufacturers  of  
the  routers  (Cisco,  Motorola,  and  Netgear)  sued  Innovatio,  asserting  a  claim  under  the  
federal  RICO  statute  and  several  claims  under  California  state  law.27    The  complaint  
alleged  that  Innovatio  had  made  numerous  false  statements  in  its  letters,  including  
statements  that  it  had  “successfully  licensed  thousands  of  business  locations  under  
the  .  .  .  patents”  and  that  “the  validity  of  many  claims  of  the  .  .  .  patents  ha[d]  been  
confirmed  by  both  the  Federal  Circuit  and  the  United  States  Patent  Office,  via  both  
judicial  and  re-­‐‑examination  proceedings.”28    On  Innovatio’s  motion  to  dismiss,  the  court  
                                                
26  By  my  count,  since  2004,  the  Federal  Circuit  has  barred  the  plaintiff’s  claim  in  all  but  one  case  
raising  an  immunity  issue.    See  Matthews  Int’l  Corp.  v.  Biosafe  Eng’g,  LLC,  695  F.3d  1322,  1332  (Fed.  Cir.  
2012);  Contech  Stormwater  Solutions,  Inc.  v.  Baysaver  Techs.,  Inc.,  310  F.  App’x  404,  409  (Fed.  Cir.  2009);  
800  Adept,  Inc.  v.  Murex  Sec.,  Ltd.,  539  F.3d  1354,  1372  (Fed.  Cir.  2008);  Judkins  v.  HT  Window  Fashion  
Corp.,  529  F.3d  1334,  1339  (Fed.  Cir.  2008);  Dominant  Semiconductors  Sdn.  Bhd.  v.  OSRAM  GmbH,  524  
F.3d  1254,  1264  (Fed.  Cir.  2008);  GP  Indus.,  Inc.  v.  Eran  Indus.,  Inc.,  500  F.3d  1369,  1375-­‐‑76  (Fed.  Cir.  2007);  
Serio-­‐‑US  Indus.,  Inc.  v.  Plastic  Recovery  Techs.  Corp.,  459  F.3d  1311,  1321  (Fed.  Cir.  2006).    But  see  
Breckenridge  Pharm.,  Inc.  v.  Metabolite  Labs.,  Inc.,  444  F.3d  1356,  1369  (Fed.  Cir.  2006)  (reversing  
summary  judgment,  holding  that  “the  question  of  whether  [the  patent  holder’s]  statements  .  .  .  were  
‘objectively  baseless’  is  genuinely  disputed”).  
27  Innovatio,  921  F.  Supp.  2d  at  906.  
28  Id.  at  920-­‐‑21.  
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accepted  the  plaintiffs’  allegations  as  true  but  still  dismissed  the  complaint.29    Although  
the  plaintiffs  alleged  that  Innovatio  had  lied  in  its  demand  letters,  the  court  reasoned  
that  Innovatio  was  immune  from  civil  liability  because  the  plaintiffs  did  not  plead  that  
Innovatio’s  infringement  claims  were  objectively  baseless,30  as  the  Federal  Circuit  
requires.  
Likewise,  a  federal  district  court  in  Nebraska  enjoined  that  state’s  attorney  
general  from  pursuing  a  state-­‐‑law  case  against  MPHJ  because  the  attorney  general  did  
not  allege  that  MPHJ’s  theories  of  validity  and  infringement  were  objectively  baseless.31    
The  attorney  general  argued  that  MPHJ  had  made  “false  and  misleading  
representations”  in  its  demand  letters,  such  as  statements  that  many  businesses  had  
already  purchased  a  license  and  that  it  intended  to  file  suit  against  recipients  who  did  
not  purchase  a  license.32    But  the  court  held  that  to  strip  MPHJ  of  immunity,  the  
attorney  general  had  to  show  that  MPHJ’s  theories  of  validity  and  infringement  were  
objectively  baseless,  which  the  attorney  general  had  not  done.33      
                                                
29  Id.  at  922.  
30  Id.  at  921.  
31  See  Activision  TV,  Inc.  v.  Bruning,  No.  8:13-­‐‑CV-­‐‑215,  slip  op.  at  13-­‐‑14  (D.  Neb.  Sept.  2,  2014).  
32  See  id.  at  13.  
33  Id.  at  11,  13-­‐‑14.  
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In  short,  it  is  not  hyperbole  to  say  that,  under  the  Federal  Circuit’s  immunity  
doctrine,  patent  holders  have  a  “legal  right  to  lie”  in  their  demand  letters.34    It  is  these  
(legally  protected)  lies  that  are  motivating  increased  interest  by  state  governments  in  
regulating  patent  enforcement.  
B.   Limits  on  the  Power  of  the  Federal  Government?  
Courts  and  commentators  sometimes  call  the  immunity  enjoyed  by  patent  
holders  a  matter  of  “preemption”  because  it  is  most  frequently  invoked  when  an  
alleged  infringer  relies  on  state  law  to  challenge  a  patent  holder’s  behavior  in  enforcing  
a  federal  patent.35    The  term  “preemption”  suggests  that  the  source  of  the  immunity  
doctrine  is  the  Constitution’s  Supremacy  Clause,  which  limits  the  power  of  state  
governments,  not  the  federal  government.    In  more  recent  cases,  however,  the  Federal  
Circuit  has  made  clear  that  its  immunity  doctrine  stems  not  from  the  Supremacy  Clause  
alone,  but  from  the  First  Amendment,36  which  does  limit  the  power  of  the  federal  
government.    As  a  consequence,  the  immunity  doctrine  seems  to  apply  equally  to  state  
governments  and  the  federal  government,  and  patent  holders  may  be  able  to  claim  
                                                
34  Steven  Seidenberg,  Infringe  Benefits:    Patent  Trolls  Getting  First  Amendment  Protection,  A.B.A.  J.,  
May  2014,  http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent_trolls_are_getting_first_amendment_  
protection_for_demand_letters,  archived  at  http://perma.cc/LQ82-­‐‑JSV5.  
35  See,  e.g.,  Hunter  Douglas,  Inc.  v.  Harmonic  Design,  Inc.,  153  F.3d  1318,  1338  (Fed.  Cir.  1998);  
David  Lee  Johnson,  Note,  Facing  Down  the  Trolls:    States  Stumble  on  the  Bridge  to  Patent-­‐‑Assertion  Regulation,  
71  WASH.  &  LEE  L.  REV.  2023,  2027  (2014).  
36  Globetrotter  Software,  Inc.  v.  Elan  Computer  Grp.,  Inc.,  362  F.3d  1367,  1377  (Fed.  Cir.  2004)  
(“Our  decision  to  permit  state-­‐‑law  tort  liability  for  only  objectively  baseless  allegations  of  infringement  
rests  on  both  federal  preemption  and  the  First  Amendment.”).  
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immunity  from  federal  initiatives  to  fight  patent  trolls,  too—including  any  legislation  
this  Committee  might  consider  adopting.  
IV.   An  Argument  Against  Broad  Immunity  
It  is  not,  however,  a  foregone  conclusion  that  patent  holders  will  be  able  to  claim  
broad  immunity  from  government  efforts  to  regulate  unfair  or  deceptive  demand  
letters.    To  the  extent  that  challenges  to  patent  enforcement  conduct  proceed  in  state  
court,  such  as  the  Vermont  attorney  general’s  suit  against  MPHJ,  those  courts  could  
develop  a  different,  narrower  immunity  rule  than  the  Federal  Circuit  has  developed,  for  
state  courts  are  not  bound  to  follow  Federal  Circuit  law.    Indeed,  there  is  a  strong  
argument  based  on  law,  policy,  and  historical  practice  that  the  Federal  Circuit  has  erred  
in  granting  patent  holders  such  broad  immunity  for  their  enforcement  conduct.      
To  begin  with,  the  Federal  Circuit  has  arguably  misconstrued  the  relevant  law.    
The  Federal  Circuit  has  derived  its  immunity  test  from  the  requirements  imposed  by  
the  Supreme  Court  on  plaintiffs  who  seek  to  inflict  antitrust  liability  on  defendants  
based  on  those  defendants’  pursuit  of  litigation.37    This  doctrine,  often  called  the  Noerr-­‐‑
Pennington  doctrine  (or  Noerr  doctrine,  for  short),38  stems  from  the  Supreme  Court’s  
interpretation  of  the  federal  antitrust  statute,  the  Sherman  Act,  in  the  light  of  the  First  
Amendment’s  Petition  Clause,  which  protects  “the  right  of  the  people  .  .  .  to  petition  the  
                                                
37  Id.  at  1375.  
38  The  doctrine’s  name  stems  from  the  cases  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  first  developed  it.    See  E.  
R.R.  Presidents  Conf.  v.  Noerr  Motor  Freight,  Inc.,  365  U.S.  127  (1961);  United  Mine  Workers  of  Am.  v.  
Pennington,  381  U.S.  657  (1965).  
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government  for  a  redress  of  grievances.”39    But  the  Federal  Circuit’s  reliance  on  Noerr’s  
view  of  the  Petition  Clause  is  a  mistake:    Letters  sent  from  one  private  party  to  another,  
such  as  letters  threatening  patent  infringement  litigation,  are  simply  not  “petition[s]”  to  
“the  government”  within  the  meaning  of  the  First  Amendment.      
By  looking  to  history,  the  Federal  Circuit  could  better  strike  a  balance  between  
protecting  patent  holders  from  liability  when  they  make  legitimate  allegations  of  
infringement  and  punishing  patent  holders  when  they  employ  unfair  or  deceptive  
tactics.    At  the  time  the  Federal  Circuit  was  created  in  1982,  the  lower  federal  courts  
had—for  nearly  a  century—been  addressing  the  precise  question  of  when  a  patent  
holder  may  be  held  liable  for  its  enforcement  conduct.    Those  courts  enjoined  patent  
holders  from  making  infringement  assertions  in  bad  faith—exactly  the  behavior  that  
many  of  the  new  state  statutes  condemn.40    But  the  Federal  Circuit  has  largely  ignored  
that  long  line  of  decisions,  instead  demanding  that  anyone  challenging  patent  
enforcement  conduct  prove  that  the  infringement  allegations  were  objectively  baseless.  
Historically,  the  courts  treated  bad  faith  as  a  flexible  standard  with  both  
subjective  and  objective  components.41    Under  this  equity-­‐‑based  immunity  standard—as  
opposed  to  the  rigid  “objective  baselessness”  test  mandated  by  the  Federal  Circuit—the  
                                                
39  U.S.  Const.  amend.  I.  
40  See,  e.g.,  Emack  v.  Kane,  34  Fed.  46,  50-­‐‑51  (C.C.N.D.  Ill.  1888).  
41  See  Mark  S.  Bicks,  Threatening  to  Sue  for  Patent  Infringement:    Unfair  Competition  and  Antitrust  
Consequences,  59  J.  PAT.  OFF.  SOC’Y  302,  303-­‐‑04  (1977)  (“The  good  faith  involved  refers  to  a  state  of  mind  
and,  in  this  context,  means  that  the  speaker  sincerely  and  reasonably  believes  in  the  truth  of  his  
statements.”).  
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government  could  impose  reasonable  restrictions  on  patent  enforcement,  enjoining  
enforcement  campaigns  where,  for  instance,  the  patent  holder  threatened  a  large  
number  of  accused  infringers42  or  failed  to  follow  its  threats  with  actual  lawsuits.43    At  
the  same  time,  cases  in  which  courts  enjoined  enforcement  conduct  under  the  
traditional  standard  were  usually  egregious  and  often  involved  claims  that  were  
objectively  weak  on  the  merits.44    Accordingly,  a  good  faith  immunity  standard—as  
opposed  to  the  Federal  Circuit’s  “objective  baselessness”  rule—would  protect  patent  
holders’  ability  to  provide  legitimate  notice  of  their  patent  rights  while  offering  the  
government  some  leeway  to  punish  deceptive  behavior.    
V.   What  Can  Congress  Do?  
If,  as  the  Federal  Circuit  claims,  broad  immunity  for  patent  holders  is  mandated  
by  the  First  Amendment,  it  might  appear  as  if  there  is  little  Congress  can  do  to  regulate  
demand  letters.    However,  I  believe  Congress  can  still  play  an  important  role  in  this  
area.    To  begin  with,  this  hearing  can  serve  the  important  function  of  bringing  a  
problematic  line  of  cases  to  the  attention  of  both  the  Federal  Circuit  and  the  Supreme  
Court.    This  Committee’s  discussion  could  encourage  the  Federal  Circuit  to  reconsider  
its  case  law.      
                                                
42  E.g.,  Int’l  Indus.  &  Devs.,  Inc.  v.  Farbach  Chem.  Co.,  241  F.2d  246,  247-­‐‑48  (6th  Cir.  1957).  
43  E.g.,  Adriance,  Platt  &  Co.  v.  Nat’l  Harrow  Co.  121  F.  827,  829-­‐‑30  (2d  Cir.  1903).  
44  E.g.,  Emack,  34  Fed.  at  49.  
 19  
Such  a  response  to  the  work  of  a  congressional  committee  would  not  be  
unprecedented.    Several  scholars  (including  myself)  have  observed  that  the  Federal  
Circuit  keeps  close  watch  when  Congress  considers  amending  patent  law  and  have  
found  numerous  examples  of  the  court  revising  its  case  law  to  align  with  proposed  
legislation.45    For  instance,  in  the  mid-­‐‑to-­‐‑late  2000s,  Congress  considered  several  bills  to  
restrict  plaintiffs’  choice  of  venue  in  patent  cases.    While  those  bills  were  pending,  the  
Federal  Circuit—for  the  first  time  ever—ordered  a  district  court  to  transfer  a  patent  case  
to  a  more  convenient  venue.46    After  that  initial  decision,  the  Federal  Circuit  issued  
several  more  opinions  ordering  transfer.47    To  date,  the  core  venue  statute  remains  
unchanged.48      
Likewise,  during  roughly  the  same  time  period,  Congress  was  considering  
proposals  to  limit  damages  in  patent  cases.    While  those  proposals  were  pending,  the  
Federal  Circuit  issued  several  decisions  increasing  its  scrutiny  of  damages  awards.    For  
instance,  the  court  conducted  a  close  review  of  the  facts  supporting  a  jury’s  royalty  
calculation,  overturning  a  nearly  $358  million  award  against  Microsoft  as  unsupported  
                                                
45  See  Paul  R.  Gugliuzza,  The  Federal  Circuit  as  a  Federal  Court,  54  WM.  &  MARY.  L.  REV.  1791,  1827-­‐‑
28  (2013);  see  also  Jonas  Anderson,  Congress  as  a  Catalyst  of  Patent  Reform  at  the  Federal  Circuit,  63  AM.  U.  L.  
REV.  961,  966-­‐‑69  (2014).  
46  See  In  re  TS  Tech  USA  Corp.,  551  F.3d  1315,  1321-­‐‑22  (Fed.  Cir.  2008);  see  also  28  U.S.C.  §  1404(a)  
(“For  the  convenience  of  parties  and  witnesses,  in  the  interest  of  justice,  a  district  court  may  transfer  any  
civil  action  to  any  other  district  or  division  where  it  might  have  been  brought  .  .  .  .”).  
47  See  generally  Paul  R.  Gugliuzza,  The  New  Federal  Circuit  Mandamus,  45  IND.  L.  REV.  343,  346  
(2012).  
48  See  28  U.S.C.  §  1400(b).  
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by  the  evidence.49    The  court  also  rejected  the  much-­‐‑maligned  “25  percent  rule  of  
thumb”  as  a  starting  point  for  the  hypothetical  negotiation  used  to  calculate  a  
reasonable  royalty.50    Thus,  the  fact  that  the  Committee  is  holding  this  hearing  and  
considering  legislation  to  regulate  patent  demand  letters  could  spur  the  Federal  Circuit  
to  reconsider  its  immunity  doctrine.      
In  addition,  this  hearing  draws  attention  to  the  important  efforts  of  state  
governments  to  combat  abusive  patent  enforcement.    The  proliferation  of  state  statutes  
and  state  law  enforcement  activities  raises  the  question  of  whether,  going  forward,  this  
problem  is  best  solved  through  state-­‐‑federal  cooperation  or  whether  patent  law  should  
remain  the  federal  government’s  exclusive  domain.      
Congress  could,  if  it  so  chooses,  expressly  preempt  state  law  in  this  area  
pursuant  to  the  Supremacy  Clause.    A  single,  federal  statute  governing  patent  
enforcement  has  some  obvious  benefits:    It  would  provide  a  uniform  legal  standard  to  
govern  all  patent  enforcement  efforts  undertaken  anywhere  in  the  country.    A  uniform  
legal  standard  should,  in  theory,  allow  patent  holders  to  better  predict  whether  their  
actions  are  lawful  or  not.      
But  the  benefits  of  legal  uniformity  should  not  be  overstated.    Several  scholars  
(myself  included)  have  recently  questioned  whether  uniformity  is  a  sufficiently  
important  policy  goal  in  the  patent  system  that  it  should  outweigh  the  benefits  of  
                                                
49  Lucent  Techs.,  Inc.  v.  Gateway,  Inc.,  580  F.3d  1301,  1324-­‐‑36  (Fed.  Cir.  2009).  
50  Uniloc  USA,  Inc.  v.  Microsoft  Corp.,  632  F.3d  1292,  1315  (Fed.  Cir.  2011).  
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interjurisdictional  dialogue  and  experimentation.51    It  is  likely  no  coincidence  that,  since  
states  began  adopting  anti-­‐‑troll  statutes,  the  frequency  of  mass  enforcement  campaigns  
seems  to  be  decreasing.    State-­‐‑by-­‐‑state  regulation  in  this  area  may  have  significant  
deterrence  value:    Rather  than  defending  against,  say,  one  investigation  brought  by  the  
Federal  Trade  Commission,  a  patent  holder  might  be  forced  to  defend  against  multiple  
lawsuits  in  multiple  states,  brought  by  both  private  plaintiffs  and  state  attorneys  
general.      
State  law  enforcement  agencies  also  provide  substantial  enforcement  resources.    
The  ability  of  dozens  of  states’  attorneys  general  offices,  joining  together,  to  monitor  
and  punish  deceptive  patent  enforcement  behavior  likely  dwarfs  what  the  federal  
government  could  do.    And  state  governments  are  more  accessible  than  the  federal  
government  to  those  most  likely  to  be  targeted  by  bottom-­‐‑feeder  trolls:    small  
businesses,  nonprofits,  and  local  governments.    Vermont’s  pathmarking  statute,  for  
instance,  was  the  product  of  a  grassroots  effort:    businesses  and  non-­‐‑profits  in  the  state  
that  had  received  demand  letters  from  trolls  approached  their  state  legislators  and  
attorney  general  and,  together,  they  drafted  Vermont’s  statute.      
An  approach  to  regulating  demand  letters  that  emphasizes  the  respective  
strengths  of  state  governments  and  the  federal  government  would  be  optimal.    One  
                                                
51  See  Paul  R.  Gugliuzza,  Patent  Law  Federalism,  2014  WIS.  L.  REV.  11,  48-­‐‑51;  Craig  Allen  Nard  &  
John  F.  Duffy,  Rethinking  Patent  Law’s  Uniformity  Principle,  101  NW.  U.  L.  REV.  1619,  1623  (2007);  Lisa  
Larrimore  Ouellette,  Patent  Experimentalism,  101  VA.  L.  REV.  (forthcoming  2015)  (manuscript  at  7-­‐‑13),  
available  at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774.  
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important  strength  of  federal  regulation,  which  has  not  been  widely  discussed,  is  that  it  
could  provide  certainty  about  which  courts  can  hear  cases  involving  unfair  or  deceptive  
patent  demand  letters.    The  federal  district  courts  have  exclusive  subject-­‐‑matter  
jurisdiction  over  cases  “arising  under”  patent  law,52  meaning  that  state  courts  cannot  
hear  those  cases.    But  difficult  questions  occur  when  a  plaintiff  asserts  a  state-­‐‑law  claim  
that  implicates  federal  patent  law,  such  as  the  Vermont  attorney  general’s  consumer  
protection  lawsuit  against  MPHJ.    MPHJ  was  able  to  delay  that  suit  for  nearly  a  year  by  
arguing  that  the  state  had  improperly  filed  the  case  in  state  court.53    If  Congress  were  to  
enact  a  federal  statute  governing  patent  demand  letters,  cases  involving  claims  under  
that  statute  would  be—without  question—subject  to  the  federal  courts’  exclusive  
subject-­‐‑matter  jurisdiction.    
A  federal  statute  governing  patent  demand  letters  could  also  reduce  uncertainty  
on  matters  of  personal  jurisdiction.    The  courts  of  a  particular  state  may  exercise  
jurisdiction  over  a  defendant  only  if  the  defendant  has  “certain  minimum  contacts”  
with  that  state  “such  that  the  maintenance  of  the  suit  does  not  offend  traditional  notions  
of  fair  play  and  substantial  justice.”54    Typically,  the  personal  jurisdiction  of  a  federal  
court  is  the  same  as  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  state  in  which  the  federal  court  
                                                
52  28  U.S.C.  §  1338(a).  
53  A  federal  district  court  ultimately  rejected  MPHJ’s  jurisdictional  argument  and  sent  the  case  
back  to  state  court.    See  Vermont  v.  MPHJ  Tech.  Investments,  LLC,  No.  2:13-­‐‑CV-­‐‑170,  2014  WL  1494009,  at  
*1  (D.  Vt.  Apr.  15,  2014).  
54  Int’l  Shoe  Co.  v.  Washington,  326  U.S.  310,  316  (1945).  
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sits.55    And  the  Federal  Circuit  has  held  that  a  patent  holder  who  merely  sends  cease-­‐‑
and-­‐‑desist  letters  into  a  state  does  not  create  the  required  minimum  contacts  with  that  
state.56    This  rule  enables  litigants  such  as  MPHJ  to  argue  that  the  act  of  sending  
demand  letters  into  Vermont  is  not  sufficient  to  allow  a  court  sitting  in  Vermont—state  
or  federal—to  exercise  jurisdiction  over  it.57    Under  MPHJ’s  reading  of  the  Federal  
Circuit’s  case  law,  which  is  not  unreasonable,  any  litigant  who  wishes  to  challenge  its  
demand  letter  practices  must  travel  to  MPHJ’s  home  state  of  Texas.    Congress,  however,  
has  the  power  to  authorize  the  federal  courts  to  exercise  personal  jurisdiction  on  a  
nationwide  basis.58    Thus,  a  federal  statute  on  unfair  or  deceptive  patent  demand  letters  
could  ensure  that  a  patent  holder  who  blankets  the  country  with  letters  could  be  sued  in  
any  federal  district  court  in  the  United  States.        
Assuming  Congress  chooses  to  adopt  a  federal  statute  regulating  demand  letters,  
what  conduct,  exactly,  should  it  outlaw?    Setting  aside  for  the  moment  the  
constitutional  constraints  discussed  above,59  the  concept  of  “bad  faith”  should,  in  my  
view,  be  at  the  core  of  the  statute.    As  discussed,  a  long  line  of  pre-­‐‑Federal  Circuit  case  
law  provides  substantial  guidance  to  courts  in  making  bad  faith  determinations.    
                                                
55  See  FED.  R.  CIV.  P.  4(k)(1)(A).  
56  See,  e.g.,  Red  Wing  Shoe  Co.  v.  Hockerson-­‐‑Halberstadt,  Inc.,  148  F.3d  1355,  1361  (Fed.  Cir.  1998);  
see  also  Megan  M.  La  Belle,  Patent  Litigation,  Personal  Jurisdiction,  and  the  Public  Good,  18  GEO.  MASON  L.  
REV.  43,  47-­‐‑48  (2010)  (critiquing  this  line  of  cases).  
57  See  Defendant  MPHJ  Tech.  Investments,  LLC’s  Motion  to  Dismiss  at  6-­‐‑13,  Vermont  v.  MPHJ  
Tech.  Investments,  LLC,  No.  2:13-­‐‑CV-­‐‑170  (D.  Vt.  filed  Sept.  17,  2013).    
58  See  FED.  R.  CIV.  P.  4(k)(1)(C).  
59  See  supra  Part  III.  
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Because  of  that  already-­‐‑existing  case  law,  I  would  argue  that  there  is  no  need  for  the  
statute  to  define  bad  faith  in  great  detail.    A  long  list  of  statutory  factors,  or  a  
complicated  statutory  definition,  would  obscure  the  basic,  equitable  purpose  of  the  bad  
faith  inquiry.60      
Conclusion  
Thank  you  again  for  inviting  me  to  testify.    In  my  statement,  I  have  sought  to  
highlight  that  patent  holders  might  currently  enjoy  an  unduly  broad  immunity  from  
civil  liability  for  their  enforcement  conduct.    Although  this  immunity  could  limit  the  
power  of  Congress  to  take  action  against  those  who  abuse  the  patent  system,  I  hope  this  
hearing  will  encourage  further  discussion,  both  in  Congress  and  in  the  courts,  about  the  
proper  scope  of  protection  for  patent  holders  and  about  whether  the  states  or  the  
federal  government  are  best  situated  to  solve  this  important  problem.    I  would  be  
pleased  to  answer  any  questions  the  Committee  might  have  for  me.              
  
  
                                                
60  See  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  REFLECTIONS  ON  JUDGING  86-­‐‑87  (2013)  (critiquing  multifactor  legal  tests  
because  they  obscure  the  core  purpose  of  the  relevant  law).  
